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Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2010-2011

Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report is submitted in the context of actions taken or expected to be taken by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council regarding special political missions, including good offices, and preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peacebuilding missions, on the basis of requests from Governments and/or recommendations of the Secretary-General.

By its resolution 63/266, the General Assembly approved a preliminary estimate of some $4,871 million as the basis for the preparation by the Secretary-General of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2010-2011. The budget outline includes a provision of $776,266,800 for special political missions related to peace and security that are expected to be extended or approved in the course of the biennium.

The budget outline also includes a provision of $52,661,600 representing the estimated requirements for the biennium 2010-2011 emanating from the adoption of General Assembly resolution 63/250 in relation to the harmonization of conditions of service which affect special political missions. Therefore, the provision of $52,661,600 has been included in the overall provision for special political missions, resulting in a total amount of $828,928,400.

The present report contains the proposed resource requirements for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2010 for 27 special political missions authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council, as presented in detail in documents A/63/349/Add.1-5. The total estimated requirements of those missions amount to $599,526,500 net ($637,320,600 gross).

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I. Introduction

1. The purpose of the present report is to seek funding for the first year of the biennium 2010-2011 for 27 special political missions in connection with actions taken or expected to be taken by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council on the basis of requests from Member States and/or recommendations of the Secretary-General. Although the resource requirements for one special political mission, namely, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar, whose mandate emanates from the General Assembly, will be presented in a statement of programme budget implications in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the Assembly, subject to action to be taken in the Third Committee of the General Assembly, those requirements are also simultaneously included in the current report so as to consolidate the overall resource requirements for all special political missions. It should be noted, however, that any expenditures against appropriations for special political missions would be strictly subject to the extension of the relevant mandate.

Status of extension or renewal of mandates

2. Mandates for the majority of the special political missions presented here have been renewed or extended into 2010, and requests for the extension or renewal of mandates of the remaining few missions are before, or are being submitted to, the Security Council and the General Assembly.

3. Of the 27 missions whose requirements are set out in the present report:

(a) Nine missions (the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004), the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on the Great Lakes region, the Office of the Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL), the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA), the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), and the United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC)) have open-ended mandates;

(b) One mission (support to the Security Council Committee established by Council resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction) has its mandate expiring on 25 April 2011;

(c) Ten missions (the Monitoring Group on Somalia, the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)) have mandates of various dates, ranging from January to December 2010;

(d) One mission, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar, is under consideration by the General Assembly;

(e) The remaining six missions, namely, the Panel of Experts on Liberia, the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire, the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1526 (2004) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) and the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), have mandates expiring at the end of December 2009.

4. In the case of the missions referred to in paragraph 3 (d) and (e) above, it is anticipated that the General Assembly and the Security Council, on the basis of reports and requests already submitted or to be submitted to them, will extend the mandates of these missions for periods similar to those approved for 2009 and 2010.

Missions completed or discontinued in 2009

5. It should be noted that the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) has been transformed into the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), that the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) will be liquidated by 31 December 2009 and fully transformed into the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) starting 1 January 2010 and that the United Nations representative to the International Advisory and Monitoring Board is expected to complete his mandate at the same time. Further, the mandates of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Lord's Resistance Army-affected Areas and the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) were fully liquidated by the end of June 2009.

Organization of the reports on the budgets of special political missions

6. As was the case for 2009, the budget proposals for special political missions for 2010 are organized around thematic clusters, while the budgets for larger missions, namely UNAMA and UNAMI, are presented in separate addenda:

(a) Thematic cluster I: Special and personal envoys, and special advisers of the Secretary-General (A/64/349/Add.1);

(b) Thematic cluster II: Sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels (A/64/349/Add.2);

(c) Thematic cluster III: United Nations offices, peacebuilding offices, integrated offices and commissions (A/64/349/Add.3);

(d) United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) (A/64/349/Add.4);

(e) United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) (A/64/349/Add.5).

7. In accordance with the comments and suggestions of the Advisory Committee, efforts have been made to adapt and follow as closely as practical, the format and presentation of budgets for peacekeeping operations. Further efforts will be made as necessary to improve and rationalize the grouping and presentation of future budget proposals for special political missions.

Performance information for 2008-2009

8. Taking into account comments made by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in paragraph 10 of its report (A/63/593), information has been included in the present report on the programmatic performance of special political missions in 2008-2009 with a focus on the status of achievement of expected accomplishments for 2008-2009, highlighting success factors or factors that negatively influenced the achievement of the planned results. Further, results that have been achieved in lieu of the planned accomplishments are indicated, as well as the significance of the achieved results vis-à-vis the overall objective of each mission.

Operational environment, including cooperation and synergies and the level of collaboration with and between missions, the United Nations country team and United Nations Headquarters

9. Further efforts have been made to include information in the introductory part of each individual mission budget on the collaboration and cooperation with other United Nations entities and partners, taking into account the recommendations of the Advisory Committee contained in paragraph 7 of its report (A/63/593).

II. Reporting requirements related to special political missions emanating from General Assembly resolution 63/261 on the strengthening of the Department of Political Affairs

10. In its resolution 63/261 on the strengthening of the Department of Political Affairs, the General Assembly endorsed the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Advisory Committee on the strengthening of the Department of Political Affairs (A/62/7/Add.32), subject to the provisions of the resolution. In paragraph 14 of its report on budgetary requirements for special political missions for 2009 (A/63/593), the Committee recalled the observations and recommendations related to the support and management of special political missions made in paragraphs 10 to 23 of the above-mentioned report and requested that a comprehensive report on special political missions also include:

(a) An analysis of the criteria taken into consideration in establishing special political missions;

(b) The basis for proposing the different modalities and structures, including the distinct roles, functions and planning involved;

(c) The means available for reviewing the activities and performance of special political missions and for ensuring oversight and accountability;

(d) The mechanisms or benchmarks for recommending the conclusion of special political missions;

(e) The application of lessons learned, either in making future proposals or in managing current special political missions.

11. In its resolution 63/261, the General Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to explore potential synergies and complementarities among special political missions (para. 11) and to identify means to achieve greater

complementarities and synergies between the Department of Political Affairs and other departments and offices of the United Nations Secretariat as well as other relevant actors of the United Nations system (para. 25).

12. In the interests of efficiency, details on the aforementioned matters are included in the present report to facilitate discussion with legislative bodies on matters of policy pertaining to the distinct set of activities funded through the special political mission provision of the regular budget, at the same time that resource requirements are considered for this purpose in 2010.

13. It has become increasingly clear that greater predictability and established procedures for the management and oversight of the wide variety of activities undertaken through the use of the special political mission provision of the regular budget are required. As the use of funding from this provision has grown substantially in recent years, oversight bodies and Member States expect greater accountability and effectiveness for the operations in question, and a professional Secretariat, needs to be more responsive in assuring management control. The concerned departments, especially the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Management and the Department of Field Support will need to continue to systematize procedures for the establishment, maintenance, oversight and liquidation of those activities. The ability to do so, however, will need to be supported with sufficient human and financial resources, both at Headquarters and in the field, for genuine improvements to be registered over time.

14. Ultimately, the goal should be that all activities conducted by the Organization, funded either through the regular budget or peacekeeping mission budgets, should be served by a predictable platform of support, a common set of procedures that enhance the speed and effectiveness of response, and globally available services in key technical areas. The establishment of the Department of Field Support with dedicated logistical and administrative capacities for field operations has provided an opportunity to sharpen the focus on more consistent support for those activities. Achieving that goal would make it possible not only to respond more effectively and efficiently but also to move from a supply-driven to a bespoke, demand-driven approach to supporting United Nations operations. While that goal may be a long-term aspiration, it is vital that current improvements are undertaken with that goal in mind.

Analysis of the criteria for establishing special political missions

15. The United Nations was established to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", and one of its main purposes is to maintain international peace and security. Article 24.1 of the Charter states that "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security". Article 29 states that "The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions" and Article 22 establishes the same principle for the General Assembly. Article 99 provides the Secretary-General with discretionary authority to "bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security". In fulfilling those responsibilities, the General Assembly, the Security Council or the Secretary-General may adopt a range of

measures, inter alia the establishment of field missions or operations, a good offices mission or the deployment of an envoy, or the establishment of sanctions panels or monitoring committees.

16. Currently, what are commonly referred to as special political missions are activities of special and personal envoys of and special advisers to the Secretary-General, support to sanctions and monitoring committees, small to medium-sized political peacebuilding, integrated and regional offices as well as assistance missions with mandates that can be defined as essentially political in nature. The term also covers United Nations participation in the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) and the operations of CTED. It is also a general principle that special political missions do not have significant military or police roles through the presence of formed police or military units, although they may have a rule of law or governance mandate in some cases, for example UNPOS, UNIOGBIS or UNAMA.

17. The Secretariat resorts to a request to the General Assembly to use the special political mission provision of the regular budget when longer-term activities are expected; this is done for the sake of sustainability and transparency. Given the very political nature and the rapidly changing contexts of many of the activities, the use of this provision affords the Secretariat and the initiating legislative body the broadest possible flexibility to adjust priorities, activities and, if required, the mandate at any point in time; this may require the development of new capabilities and revised budget requirements.

18. In terms of other specific criteria for the establishment of a special political mission, it has become established practice that a specific mandate from either the Security Council or the General Assembly is fundamental. This mandate can be provided either through a resolution or through an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Security Council acknowledging the intention to move forward with specified activities. As noted above, the Security Council and the General Assembly retain, under Articles 22 and 29 of the Charter, the privilege of establishing such subsidiary organs as they deem necessary for the performance of their functions.

19. Currently the Department of Political Affairs leads 24 of the 28 missions funded through the special political missions provision of the regular budget, while the Department of Peacekeeping Operations provides strategic and operational support to two missions (UNAMA and BINUB) through the integrated operational teams in its Office of Operations. The Department of Field Support provides logistical and administrative support to all peacekeeping operations and 14 political missions based in the field, while the Executive Office of the Department of Political Affairs provides logistical and administrative support to the 11 special envoys, special advisers and sanctions panels based in New York. CTED reports directly to the Security Council and manages its own administration, and the Secretariat's participation in IAMB is led by the Department of Management. The Office for Disarmament Affairs is the substantive and administrative lead department for support to the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). A full list of missions, including their lead department and administrative and logistical support arrangements is provided in annex I.

20. The decision as to which department leads a particular activity rests with the Secretary-General. The concept of "lead department" was established under the

previous Secretary-General to minimize overlap and duplication between the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Further to the Secretary-General's report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (A/63/881-S/2009/304), the two departments are updating the lead department concept, for the consideration of the Secretary-General later in 2009.

21. As noted by the Office of Internal Oversight Services in its report (A/61/357), both the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs plan, launch and lead field missions, with the administrative and logistical support of the Department of Field Support. Depending on the relative significance of the mandates and life cycles of field missions, the Policy Committee of the Secretary-General assigns the lead responsibility to direct a field mission to either the Department of Peacekeeping Operations or the Department of Political Affairs, in accordance with the "lead-department" policy. While the Office of Internal Oversight Services pointed out a weakness in the policy regarding special political missions, namely, the lack of clear criteria or transparent decision-making mechanisms to determine the lead department, which presents an inherent risk of duplication and overlap between the two departments, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations explained that the field missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs were, in most cases, quite distinct. The roles of and division of labour between the two departments were clarified by the Secretary-General in 2002 in his report entitled "Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for further change" (A/57/387 and Corr.1) and are laid out in newly revised Secretary-General's bulletins (ST/SGB/2009/9 and ST/SGB/2009/13).

22. Further to paragraph 126 of the Secretary-General's 2002 "agenda for further change" (A/57/387), the Department of Political Affairs has continued to increase its focus in the field of conflict prevention and peacemaking, and remains the lead department for political and peacebuilding offices. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations remains the lead department for the planning and management of all peace and security operations in the field. Most of them comprise a significant military and/or police presence, but in some cases the majority of personnel are civilians, for example, UNAMA.

Basis for proposing different modalities and structures, including the distinct roles, functions and planning involved

23. Missions or operations funded under the special political missions provision of the regular budget span a wide range of activities, as demonstrated in various mission budgets submitted in the addenda to the present report. The initiating legislative authority may make a specific determination on the type of mission, on a case-by-case basis, and depending on the context of any given situation, on the scope of activities.

24. The Secretary-General is charged with implementing and operationalizing mandates. To that end, he must make a determination about the appropriate mission structure, the level of the mission's leadership, and the proposed budget and staffing requirements. In doing so, he relies on a detailed assessment of the specific needs on the ground, on past experience, lessons learned and the experiences of the staff in similar missions. The Department of Political Affairs, the Department of

Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support have commenced developing standard operating procedures related to mission start-up, transition from one type of mission to another, and mission liquidation. These standard operating procedures will ultimately be cleared by each Department's senior management team and shared by the senior management with all staff.

25. At Headquarters, activities currently funded under the special political mission provision of the regular budget are (i) good offices ventures, involving a senior representative of the Secretary-General and a small number of staff, (ii) panels of experts or monitoring teams, supported by a small secretariat and the Security Council Subsidiary Organs Branch and (iii) a single representative to a multilateral mechanism, such as the Secretary-General's representative to IAMB. Activities have also been initiated for specific thematic issues, such as the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the prevention of genocide, or CTED.

26. *Cluster I missions*. In the case of cluster I missions (good offices and special envoys), the Secretary-General consults broadly, especially with the relevant parties, and develops a profile and terms of reference for a suitable envoy or special adviser. Through the lead department, he then conducts a search for an appropriate candidate, in close consultation with the concerned parties to determine what characteristics may be most appropriate. At this stage, names are often suggested by the parties themselves. Other means of identifying prospective candidates may include postings in leading publications, diplomatic notes to Member States and consultations with the Department of Field Support, which maintains an active roster of senior officials who could be deployed for this purpose. A shortlist is developed, candidates are vetted with the concerned parties and, upon selection, the appropriate legislative authority is duly informed. Depending on the scope and duration of the mandate, the Secretary-General determines the number of additional staff and the level of operational funding required. Currently, given the diversity of the mandates within cluster I, there is no set model for the staffing of these missions. A great amount of lessons learned, judgement and experience informs the Secretary-General during the selection process, the establishment of the mission structure, and the start-up of each activity. The recent establishment of the Mediation Support Unit and a best practices capacity in the Policy Planning Unit of the Department of Political Affairs has contributed to the capturing and application of lessons learned and to more efficient and effective start-up processes.

27. While the Department of Political Affairs is the lead department for the majority of good offices and special envoy missions, in several instances, including where there is an ongoing peacekeeping mission, special envoys have been directly led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Since 2004, these have included special envoys for Kosovo and Darfur.

28. *Cluster II activities* make vital contributions to the work of the Security Council and its subsidiary bodies by providing information and recommendations which these bodies would otherwise lack and thereby placing the Security Council in a better position to take effective decisions as it discharges its functions to maintain international peace and security. For the most part, each cluster II mission has at its core a group of "experts on mission" who are employed for a specific length of time, for example, 12 months, with consultant status to ensure the greatest possible independence in their findings and recommendations. Each Security Council resolution establishing such an expert body generally sets out the number of

experts to be appointed by the Secretary-General and includes very specific language describing the tasks the group is expected to perform over the course of the mandate (see, for example, annex I to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008)).

29. Following the adoption of such a resolution, the Department of Political Affairs, on behalf of the Secretary-General, determines the areas of expertise required by the individuals who will serve on the panel, as well as the resource requirements the panel will need to fulfil its mandate. In determining those resource requirements, the Department of Political Affairs draws on the experience it has gained through supporting eight separate sanctions monitoring groups over the course of more than 25 separate mandates since 1999. The Department of Political Affairs also consults with interested Security Council members, typically the principle drafters/sponsors of the relevant resolution, regarding the type of expertise required to fulfil the mandate. In some cases, the relevant resolution will indicate where the expert group is to be based. For example, it was explicitly stipulated in Security Council resolution 1591 (2005) that the Panel of Experts on the Sudan should be based in Addis Ababa. When a base of operations is not explicitly determined by the Council, the Department of Political Affairs can decide to administer a sanctions monitoring group as a home-based group. This means that in periods when the group is not conducting its investigations in-country or engaging in other official travel, the experts work from their home locations.

30. In resolutions establishing or renewing the mandate of sanctions monitoring groups, the Security Council customarily requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary financial arrangements to support the work of the group. Related funding requests presented to the General Assembly for approval are intended to address the full range of tasks assigned by the Council, through the provision of additional consultants to assist the appointed panellists in specific cases where supplementary expertise is required which the panellists do not have, or when the tasks to be undertaken or the geographic area to be covered are too great for the limited number of experts appointed to cope with reasonably in the limited time frame of the mandate. In cases where additional consultants are employed, specific terms of reference are prepared, the relevant Security Council committee is informed, and the use of the additional human resources is fully justified in the results-based budget submission presented to legislative bodies.

31. In order to identify suitable experts, the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs maintains an electronic roster containing the curricula vitae of some 400 individuals which automatically sorts candidates according to areas of expertise and other criteria. The roster has been stocked through, inter alia, recommendations from previously serving experts who have performed well, responses to several notes verbales which have periodically been sent to all permanent missions, and through structured engagement with the academic community, including the posting of a call for curricula vitae on academic mailing lists and discussion groups. When a new monitoring group is established by the Security Council, it is customary for the Council to request the Secretary-General, in the relevant resolution, to appoint the experts to the group in consultation with the relevant committee. Therefore, after the Department of Political Affairs has identified suitable candidates, the curricula vitae of the proposed experts are shared with and approved by the relevant Security Council committee prior to the issuance by the Secretary-General of formal letters of appointment.

32. *Cluster III missions* are field-based missions of varying size and purpose. Field-based political missions are often a cost-effective way to promote conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Field-based political missions are used to support the good offices of the Secretary-General in cases where a medium- to longer-term presence on the ground is required. They may also be used to implement a political agreement, as is the case with the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission; to provide an avenue for conflict prevention in a specific region, as does the United Nations Office for West Africa or the Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia; or for peacebuilding and peace consolidation, as in the case of the missions in Burundi (BINUB), Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) and the Central African Republic (BINUCA).

33. The structure of each of these offices varies based on the situation of the country, the specific legislative mandate and needs expressed by the parties on the ground. In most cases, the United Nations system will undertake an inter-agency strategic assessment or inter-agency technical assessment mission under the leadership of either the Department of Political Affairs or the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, to conduct a joint conflict analysis in order to formulate a shared approach for the case at hand. The needs articulated through such an assessment provide the basis for analysis to the Policy Committee of the Secretary-General, where discussions take place on the proposed structure and objectives of a possible field mission. Following such a discussion, a report of the Secretary-General is produced through a similar inter-agency process and is submitted to the appropriate legislative body, which then considers the report and establishes an appropriate mandate.

34. The level of the senior representative in a cluster III mission necessarily varies and is decided upon by the Secretary-General on the basis of several factors, including the complexity of the issue, the context, the mandate, the level of the interlocutors that the representative will need to engage with internationally and within the United Nations system, and the specific qualifications needed for the post, for example, political experience, government experience, or technical or legal know-how. Further, the Secretary-General, in his report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (A/63/881), stressed the need for "more effective and better supported United Nations leadership teams on the ground ... [to] enhance coherence and collective impact among United Nations entities but also facilitate a more coherent response from other international actors". This will be achieved with well-integrated leadership teams. The Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, as lead departments, are in the process of creating senior-level mechanisms to that end and the Department of Field Support provides dedicated support to strengthen the pool of candidates for those senior-leadership positions.

Integration

35. All field-based political missions and operations work alongside other United Nations and non-United Nations actors, resulting in various challenges (for example, with regard to management, coordination and cohesion) and opportunities (for example, resources, long-standing presence and knowledge). Challenges and opportunities sometimes also arise from the transitioning of a former peacekeeping operation into a peacebuilding or other type of mission, such as a regional office.

36. In 2008, the Secretary-General established a specific policy on integration in field missions. The policy reaffirms integration as a guiding principle for conflict and post-conflict situations where the United Nations has a country team and a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or political field mission, whether or not those presences are structurally integrated. It emphasizes the importance of strategic partnerships between the missions and United Nations country teams and identified necessary elements of integration, which can take different structural forms. For example, in some cases, a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General also acts as the Humanitarian and Resident Coordinator, in other words, is triple-hatted. The policy also specifies that such integrated approaches should be applied to most Department of Political Affairs-led field missions and offices (except for regional offices), as well as Department of Peacekeeping Operations-led missions funded through the special political mission provision of the regular budget and peacekeeping budgets.

37. Pursuant to this policy, the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations have taken steps to ensure that integrated approaches are taken in the management and support of all field-based missions funded through the special political mission provision of the regular budget. For example, integrated task forces have now been established for all missions to which the principles of integration apply. These Headquarters-based task forces seek to ensure a coherent and consistent United Nations engagement in the countries in question. The Department of Political Affairs has also conducted a survey and review of how integrated approaches are implemented in the field in order to ensure that the principles of integration are firmly adhered to.

Integrated peacebuilding offices

38. Recently, there has been increased recognition by Member States and the broader United Nations system of the importance of better cohesion of efforts, particularly as the focus and context shift from conflict resolution to longer-term peacebuilding. The establishment of integrated peacebuilding offices is one way to ensure that the United Nations system as a whole is working closely together, along with national and other international stakeholders, towards consolidating peace. The United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) was established in 2008, and the political missions in Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic are mandated to transition into integrated peacebuilding offices in 2010. The Department of Political Affairs, the lead department, is working closely with the Department of Field Support and the missions on the ground to ensure a smooth transition to these larger and more active peacebuilding missions. For missions in countries that are on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Department of Political Affairs also works very closely with the Peacebuilding Support Office.

39. The Secretary-General's 2008 policy on integration identifies the necessary elements for integration, regardless of structure. In all field presences where the principle of integration applies, there should be: (a) a shared vision of the strategic objectives of the United Nations; (b) closely aligned or integrated planning; (c) a set of agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace; and (d) agreed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation. In order to ensure that these elements are in place, the policy requires the presences to have shared analytical and planning capacity, as well as an integrated strategic

framework that should be reflected in and draw on all other United Nations planning, programming and budget instruments. This analytical and planning capacity is critical in ensuring that there is alignment and coherence among the United Nations presences on the ground.

Regional political offices

40. Regional political offices are mandated and designed to strengthen the preventive capacity of the United Nations, harmonize and facilitate the work of the United Nations system across borders and across issues, and encourage regional and collective approaches to conflict prevention. The missions work closely with Member States and regional and subregional organizations in support of their peacemaking initiatives, as well as with United Nations funds, programmes and agencies, to address the causes of potential conflict before it occurs. A regional office is purposefully small, given its catalytic and facilitating function. It is established on the basis of consensus among the Member States concerned and in recognition of shared cross-border challenges where political efforts are required to encourage collective action across a wide range of issues, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime and environmental degradation. Where appropriate and when decided by the concerned States and by the appropriate legislative authority, a regional office could replace or stand in for a single country political mission, which has a more targeted focus.

41. Experience to date shows that the two established regional offices in West Africa and Central Asia have made a significant contribution to conflict prevention and the development of shared approaches to external challenges that no one Member State or organization can deal with on its own. In West Africa, UNOWA works with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and with other United Nations entities, including other United Nations peace missions and operations, to raise awareness of and promote integrated subregional strategies to address threats to peace and the factors of instability in the region, in particular socio-economic challenges, drug trafficking and organized crime, and challenges linked to governance and the rule of law. It also undertakes good offices in emerging crises, in coordination with ECOWAS and, where appropriate, the African Union. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa is the Secretary-General's senior political representative in West Africa and has been active in several instances to stave off conflict, build confidence and create bridges with other regional efforts, ensuring that the role of the United Nations in conflict prevention is fully consistent with and complementary to regional efforts. In addition, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNOWA have played a critical role in helping individual United Nations country teams and resident coordinators to work together on cross-border issues and in assisting in elevating technical or thematic issues to the political level to ensure that effective action is taken.

42. Despite only having been open for two years, UNRCCA has been successful in working together with the five Central Asian States to facilitate joint solutions to common challenges and threats to peace and security, including drug trafficking, terrorism and environmental degradation. The Centre offers support in facilitating dialogue, reaching mutually beneficial arrangements, and supporting their implementation, such as in the area of the management of cross border resources, most notably, water. As does UNOWA, the Centre works closely with regional

organizations to encourage peacemaking initiatives, and provides an overall framework for the preventive activities of the United Nations system across the region.

Assistance missions

43. The two largest assistance missions are the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Both missions have broad mandates, pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1830 (2008) and 1868 (2009) respectively, and cover a wide range of activities including political facilitation, electoral and constitutional support, human rights and humanitarian, reconstruction and development assistance. In order to implement their respective mandates effectively, these missions require a large number of substantive, administrative and security personnel. In both missions the respective Special Representative of the Secretary-General serves as the designated official for security. Both missions are well integrated with the larger United Nations country team, and in the case of Iraq, the United Nations agencies, programmes and funds are co-located in UNAMI facilities for security and logistical reasons. Common service agreements for the provision of office and living accommodation, food and transportation are in place. Given the challenging operating environments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the main cost drivers are security and operational requirements, including military personnel, air and ground transport, and secure facilities. In both locations, as the posture and presence of foreign forces change, there are increasing demands on the United Nations to become more self-reliant. This means that there will be an increased need for timely investments in support and security infrastructure for the missions.

Other types of field-based activities

44. Special political missions come in different shapes and sizes. This is a valuable feature since they can be tailored to the needs on the ground. At the same time, the Department of Field Support is working to develop modular approaches to the provision of support so that mission design does not start from scratch every time a new mandate arises. For instance, the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) was established in 2007 as a special political mission with a focused mandate to help facilitate the peace process in Nepal. The mandate of UNMIN has since been extended by the Security Council, at the request of the Government of Nepal, and was renewed by Security Council resolution 1879 (2009) on 23 July 2009. The new mandate focuses on monitoring the management of arms and armed personnel of the two armies in line with the 25 June 2008 agreement among the political parties. Taking into account the completion of some of the elements of its mandate following the holding of the Constituent Assembly election on 10 April 2008, the mission undertook a comprehensive review and has downsized twice, in July 2008 and January 2009. Because UNMIN was intended to be a mission of limited duration, the decision was taken not to pursue a full structurally integrated model, although close collaboration exists between the United Nations country team and the mission.

45. The work of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL), based in Beirut, includes the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). In this regard, the Special Coordinator also works closely with the expanded United Nations peacekeeping mission in southern Lebanon,

UNIFIL. UNSCOL is also in constant dialogue with actors across the political spectrum in Lebanon and provides overall political guidance to the multifaceted United Nations presence in the country, including UNIFIL. In addition, UNSCOL coordinates the activities of the United Nations country team with the Government of Lebanon, donors and international financial institutions in line with the overall objectives of the United Nations in Lebanon, particularly as they relate to reconstruction, development and reform.

Means available for reviewing the activities, key benchmarks and overall performance of special political missions, including mechanisms or benchmarks for recommending the closure of special political missions

46. Each special political mission has a results-based budget and logical framework with specific objectives, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement, as well as performance measures and outputs. These specific objectives, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement serve as benchmarks and, depending on each mission's reporting cycle, progress against each of these benchmarks is provided regularly to the appropriate legislative authority via periodic reports of the Secretary-General. Further, the Security Council is increasingly providing peace consolidation benchmarks tied to a mission's overall mandate.

47. Following the development and adoption of the mission's mandate, the regional division in the lead department closely monitors the situation on the ground on the basis of mission reports and field visits, and provides overall guidance to the mission. The regional division of the Department of Political Affairs or the Department of Peacekeeping Operations undertakes reviews of the implementation of the mandate in consultation with the mission and provides the mission with recommendations on areas that call for improvement and adjustment. This is done quarterly for the first year of the mission and at least semi-annually subsequently. Electoral matters are reviewed by the Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political Affairs as required before, during and after electoral processes.

48. Where applicable, the relevant regional division leads policy discussions relevant to the mission's mandate at Headquarters, in coordination with other United Nations departments, funds, agencies and programmes through the Headquarters integrated task forces, tracking key benchmarks and established priorities where feasible. The Under-Secretaries-General of the lead department and the Department of Field Support meet with all heads of field missions regularly when they are in New York to discuss Headquarters-field mission relations and overall United Nations policies related to these field operations. Each year, at the start of the budget cycle for these missions and operations, the lead department conducts an assessment of the achievements of the mission, and prepares the new results-based budget and logical framework, adjusting the parameters as may be warranted either by a change in the mandate or by a change in the operating environment.

49. Staff at each mission and operation are subject to the United Nations system-wide performance appraisal system, which should be linked to the mission and section workplans, which are in turn based on the mission's results-based budget framework. Representatives of the Secretary-General at the Assistant Secretary-General and Under-Secretary-General levels are accountable to the Under-

Secretary-General of the lead department. In 2010, both the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations will extend the Compact system to these senior managers.

50. The Human Resources Action Plan reflects the status of key human resources indicators, and targets are aligned to organizational goals and policies set by the Secretary-General and agreed to by the oversight body, as well as the mission's results-based budget. In 2009, the leadership of each field-based mission was tasked with specific Human Resources Action Plan targets.

Exit strategies

51. The decision to extend, transition or conclude a mission is made through a feedback loop with the concerned parties, the Security Council and/or the General Assembly. Mission transition and closure are determined by whether the needs on the ground have been met and are largely mandate driven. Meetings are regularly held with the concerned parties and, on the basis of an assessment of these consultations, the Secretariat makes a recommendation in a report of the Secretary-General as to whether the mission has fulfilled its mandate or whether a continued presence is required to ensure full implementation of the mandate. On the basis of this report, the Security Council or the General Assembly will determine whether or not to transition or liquidate a mission.

52. The transition of a mission from a peacekeeping operation to a peacebuilding office, from a smaller political mission to an integrated mission, or from an envoy or peacebuilding office to a peacekeeping operation is also largely mandate driven and relies on the advice of the Security Council and the relevant parties as to whether key benchmarks have been met (for example, in the field of security sector reform or the conclusion of a peace agreement that requests military observers or peacekeeping forces) and on the results of a strategic assessment. For 2010, for example, transitions from smaller political offices to larger, more complex integrated missions are mandated for Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic.

53. *Cluster I.* When the established appointment of an envoy is nearing its end, the Secretary-General can extend such an appointment, upon the recommendation of the lead department. Appointments might be terminated for the following reasons: the conclusion of the mandate; the appointment of a new envoy; changed circumstances on the ground; or the resignation of the envoy.

54. *Cluster II.* Performance evaluation forms are prepared for each expert/consultant at the conclusion of each mandate by the relevant committee secretary in the Security Council Affairs Division/Department of Political Affairs. In addition, each sanctions monitoring group reports to the Security Council through the relevant sanctions committee. Upon its return to New York, each panel of experts makes a presentation to the relevant Security Council committee and gives an account of its activities and key achievements vis-à-vis its mandate, and members of the committee have the opportunity to comment on the expert group's methodologies and outputs. The reports and recommendations made by each expert group are carefully considered by a subsidiary organ of the intergovernmental body that established the special political mission. In the case of the Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions committee, the committee itself issues a public report concerning the

positions it has reached on the recommendations made by the sanctions monitoring team.

55. Most expert groups currently have a one-year mandate. Typically, the Security Council does not renew the mandate of an expert group until it has reviewed the final report of that group. The Security Council is therefore well positioned to modify the mandate of an expert group as may be required by developments on the ground, to alter the composition of the group, or to not renew the mandate of a given group if the need is no longer there. For example, in June 2007, the Council decided to reduce the size of the Panel of Experts on Liberia in the light of the fact that two of the five sanctions measures had recently been lifted. In December 2008, the Council decided to increase the size of the Monitoring Group on Somalia from four members to five members in the light of the imposition of additional targeted sanctions.

56. It should also be noted that when the Security Council requests the Secretary-General to appoint experts to the monitoring groups "in consultation with the Committee", this creates two layers of checks and balances insofar as the Secretary-General can decide not to propose a previously serving expert whom he feels has not performed to the required standard, while the Security Council committee members also retain the prerogative to object to an expert whom they believe has not performed adequately.

57. The Panel of Experts Information Management System (POEIMS) categorizes and stores metadata for source materials and other information gathered by expert groups during the course of their mandates, and it can also store electronic versions of those materials. This system has been distributed to five expert groups, monitoring sanctions concerning Somalia, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire and the Sudan. Metadata are currently being entered by experts working in the field and are periodically merged with the master database each time the relevant expert group visits United Nations Headquarters. The implementation of POEIMS creates greater accountability and better tools for monitoring experts' performance by creating a transparent system by which the Security Council Affairs Division can evaluate the investigative, research and reporting skills of experts on an ongoing basis by monitoring the source material and other information captured in the system.

58. *Cluster III.* When an established field mission's mandate period is nearing its end or is expected to roll over to the following year, the legislative authority (the Security Council or the General Assembly) can either terminate or extend the mandate through a presidential statement, an exchange of letters with the Secretary-General or a resolution. Following the legislative body's decision to extend the mission's mandate, the lead department prepares relevant recommendations on the continued operationalization of the mission's overall mandate.

59. Alternatively, the Secretary-General can request the legislative authority to extend the mission's mandate on his own initiative, based on consultations with the concerned parties. In such cases, the Secretary-General sends a letter to the president of the appropriate legislative authority, conveying his intention to extend the mandate. After consultations and once the appropriate legislative authority has taken note of the Secretary-General's request for an extension of the mandate, the mandate of the mission is considered to be extended and the lead department

prepares the necessary budget documentation, together with the Department of Field Support.

Application of lessons learned, either in making future proposals or in managing current special political missions

60. In the past, capturing and sharing of lessons learned in the Department of Political Affairs, including in most of the special political missions has been ad hoc and severely under-resourced. In 2007, the Office of Internal Oversight Services called for the development of a department-wide knowledge-management strategy and system for more effectively capturing, storing, sharing and integrating knowledge across divisions and units and executive management.

61. Over the past several months, the Department, through its Policy Planning Unit, has made some progress on this front. The Policy Planning Unit hosts weekly Department of Political Affairs special political mission focal point meetings to foster information-sharing and lessons learned with respect to the support and management of special political missions. It also conducted a needs assessment, including field and Headquarters consultations, as well as an electronic survey of lesson learning and knowledge-sharing practices and needs. The results of the survey demonstrated a strong desire and need for a robust Department of Political Affairs lesson learning and knowledge-sharing system, for the purposes of identifying, sharing, accessing and applying lessons learned and best practices.

62. The findings are being used to develop a departmental lesson learning and knowledge-management strategy, and to adapt and refine lesson learning and tool sharing to the needs of personnel. It is strongly believed that once launched and disseminated, these tools and strategy can assist in improving the work of all categories and levels of personnel, both in field-based missions and at Headquarters. Guidance, which will outline roles, responsibilities and mechanisms for departmental lesson learning and knowledge-sharing, is also being developed in several areas, including on mission start-up and liquidation. In the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, an established system exists for capturing lessons learned and best practices and the Department of Political Affairs has drawn on and adapted that approach to adequately tailor the support required for Department of Political Affairs political missions, which are traditionally smaller and more specialized.

Potential synergies and complementarities among special political missions and within the Secretariat

63. While the Executive Office of the Department of Political Affairs is responsible for deploying most cluster I and II missions, as they are largely New York-based, a key partner for both the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in deploying field-based activities is the Department of Field Support. Aware of the urgent need to strengthen the capacity of the Organization at Headquarters to mount and sustain field operations in the face of the increase in their volume and complexity, the Department of Field Support was established with dedicated logistical and administrative support capacities and with the aim of providing more effective, coherent and responsive support to field operations. The forthcoming Secretary-General's bulletin outlining the organization of the Department reflects this requirement. In order to clarify the roles, responsibilities and expectations of the Department of Field Support (the service

provider) and the Department of Political Affairs (the recipient), a service-level agreement is being finalized. Establishing this framework is intended to improve the quality, reliability and predictability of services and allow for the resolution of problems when they occur. The services will differ from presence to presence, depending on the mandates and needs. For example, in UNAMI, the Department of Field Support is playing a prominent role in the delivery of logistics and engineering advice for the planned construction of a mission headquarters. In other special political missions, the role of the Department of Field Support may be limited to the recruitment of a small number of staff and the formulation of the annual budget.

64. Sanctions monitoring panels are often mandated to work in areas where United Nations peacekeeping operations are also present (Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, the Sudan). While the mandates of these cluster II special political missions are highly specialized and are for the most part outside of the remit of the peacekeeping operations, the peacekeeping missions provide significant support to the monitoring groups in the form of office space, communications and information and technology equipment, and other logistical support, including air transportation in some cases. Such cooperation and support allow the panels to operate efficiently in those areas and to engage in activities that would otherwise be impossible.

Additional issues: backstopping and funding of Headquarters support to special political missions

65. The term "backstopping" can be defined as follows: (a) comprehensive substantive support for the political and other substantive aspects of the mission (support to strategic and policy planning, communication with the mission, preparation and conduct of briefing for senior United Nations leadership, managing the interdepartmental and inter-agency relationships and information-sharing at the Headquarters level); (b) briefing and reporting to intergovernmental bodies; (c) coordinating the management and administrative support pillars of the Department of Field Support (human resources management, budget and finance, and logistical and information and communications technology support); and (d) budgeting, finance, accounting and central support functions as required in the Department of Management in support of each mission. These functions may include the following specific tasks and activities:

- Budget planning and implementation
- Establishment/deployment of a field presence
- Management of the extension or renewal of the mandate
- Handover/transition, closure/liquidation of the mission
- Coordination of administrative support
- Communication and management of relationships with the appropriate legislative authority, preparation of reports and briefings by senior officials, contact with concerned and interested Member States
- Official and unofficial communications with the mission
- Guidance to the mission on mandate implementation
- Organization and conduct of field visits and assessments

- Debriefing of senior mission officials, and end of assignment reports
- Coordination with the United Nations system, application and promotion of integrated approaches

Role of the Executive Office of the Department of Political Affairs

66. The Executive Office of the Department of Political Affairs is responsible for the budget formulation, staffing, travel and day-to-day financial management and administration of all Department of Political Affairs-led cluster I and II missions. These responsibilities are in addition to the Executive Office's regular tasks of financial and expenditure control, human resources management and the day-to-day administration of the departmental budget. Increasingly, the Executive Office has also been called upon to fill the "gap" between the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Field Support, trouble-shooting to ensure adequate support for the administration of large field-based special political missions (cluster III).

67. Over the past several years, the Executive Office has had to ensure proper planning and address day-to-day operational support requirements, as well as to ensure improved reporting and budgetary oversight from the Department of Field Support for cluster III missions. The work of the Executive Office is meant to complement the backstopping work performed by Political Affairs Officers in the regional divisions, who have a variable level of capacity to take on these more administrative and technical responsibilities, such as extensive follow-up with the Department of Field Support and the respective missions on the details of personnel administration, detailed discussions on budget formulation and tracking of implementation of allotments, discussions on travel arrangements and settlements, and discussions with individual staff and consultants on their respective fees. These more technical and administrative functions are more efficiently handled in the Executive Office where there is sufficient technical knowledge and capacity to consult and coordinate with the finance and personnel divisions of the Department of Field Support as well as with the responsible organizational units of the Department of Management.

Improvements to backstopping

68. In order to respond to recommendations by the Office of Internal Oversight Services and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on the management and budgeting of missions and operations funded through the special political mission provision of the regular budget, a number of ongoing efforts have been made to improve the backstopping of missions in the Department of Political Affairs. Such measures include weekly focal point meetings for desk officers responsible for field missions, senior management team meetings focused on ensuring oversight by directors of the work and budget development of each mission or activity, the development of key standard operating procedures related to mission management and establishment, a risk assessment of the level of administrative risk presented by each mission and initial planning for the establishment of a Department of Political Affairs-wide Intranet portal to facilitate Headquarters-field communications and knowledge-management, particularly for best practices, standard operating procedures and guidelines. In addition, a Department of Political Affairs-Department of Field Support task force has been established to ensure timely and adequate support to UNOGBIS and BONUCA,

which are transitioning into integrated peacebuilding missions. The Office of Internal Oversight Services took note of many of those initiatives and the full implementation of those efforts will go a significant way to improving over time the overall management and oversight of missions funded through the special political mission provision of the regular budget.

69. Nevertheless, the adequate backstopping of missions funded through the special political mission provision of the regular budget remains a key challenge. While 27 posts were provided to the six regional divisions of the Department of Political Affairs by General Assembly resolution 63/261 to support the core work of the Department in the area of conflict prevention, the backstopping function remains seriously under-funded and unbudgeted. Even the smallest missions tend to require a dedicated staff member to provide sufficient Headquarters support. In the case of larger missions with more complex or cross-cutting mandates, additional staff support is generally warranted. In the area of logistical and administrative support, regular communication between the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Field Support is ongoing, including through the service level agreement, in an effort to improve the quality, reliability and predictability of services.

70. Backstopping provided to special political missions also by the Department of Management and other parts of the Secretariat has grown significantly as such missions have evolved in both number and complexity. Accordingly, an assessment of workload statistics related to the management of activities funded through the special political mission provision of the regular budget is envisaged, drawing as relevant from any ongoing efforts relating to backstopping of peacekeeping, with the aim of providing the results of this assessment in the 2011 budget proposal for special political missions to the General Assembly.

III. Estimated resource requirements for special political missions emanating from decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council

71. The total estimated requirements for 2010 of 27 missions amount to $599,526,500 net ($637,320,600 gross). Mission-by-mission budget estimates, requirements by component and the staffing requirements are presented in tables 1, 2 and 3 below.

72. Table 1 contains a complete list of the special political missions, indicating their respective appropriations for 2008-2009, estimated expenditures and anticipated variances at the end of 2008-2009, requirements for the next budget period (2010) as well as a variance analysis between 2010 and 2009 budget requirements. In addition, the table provides the mandates and expiry dates of individual missions and, lastly, information on those operations that have been subsumed under other missions/operations or have been liquidated or whose mandates have been completed during 2009.

73. A substantial portion of the resources sought in the present report relates to UNAMA, which accounts for the largest share of the resources requested (40.4 per cent), followed by UNAMI (26.5 per cent). Thematic cluster I, special and personal envoys, and special advisers of the Secretary-General, thematic cluster II, Sanctions

monitoring teams, groups and panels, and thematic cluster III, United Nations offices, peacebuilding offices, integrated offices and Commissions account for 1.8 per cent, 4.4 per cent and 26.9 per cent respectively of the resources requested. The proposed individual budgets for special political missions for 2010 vary widely and range from $690,700 for the activities of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara to $241.9 million for UNAMA.

Percentage distribution of the proposed budget for special political missions for 2010



74. An overall summary of requirements by major expenditure component is presented in table 2. Operational requirements account for the largest share (50.6 per cent) of the requirements.

75. The staffing requirements of each mission, by category and level, are presented in table 3. The overall change in staffing requirements includes a net increase of 595 positions from the 2009 level. This change mainly reflects the planned expansion of UNAMA by a further 818 positions, as well as the transformation of the United Nations presence in the Central African Republic and in Guinea-Bissau from the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) and the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) (involving a reduction by 96 and 32 positions, respectively) into the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) and the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) (involving the establishment of 157 and 119 positions, respectively), with an overall net effect of increasing staff for the two missions by 148 positions.

76. The action requested of the General Assembly with respect to financing is set out in section IV below.

77. A summary of the utilization of the proposed provisions for special political missions is provided in annex II to the present report.

78. It is recalled that the General Assembly, in its resolution 63/266 requested the Secretary-General to include in the report on special political missions an annex containing an updated estimate of the total budget for special political missions for

the biennium 2010-2011 for consideration by the General Assembly at the beginning of its sixty-fourth session based on updated projected needs and without prejudging the decisions of the relevant legislative organs of the United Nations. The updated estimate is contained in annex III to the present report.

79. It is also recalled that the General Assembly in its resolution 63/263 (sect. X) requested the Secretary-General to submit a new, complete and detailed proposal for the construction of the United Nations integrated compound in Baghdad, under section 32, Construction, alteration, improvement and major maintenance, of the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009, for its consideration early in the second part of its resumed sixty-third session, with detailed comprehensive financial requirements and clear timelines for the various phases of implementation. In this context, the General Assembly approved commitment authority for 2009 for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq in the amount of $5 million dollars under section 32 of the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009 to undertake design work in connection with the construction of the United Nations integrated compound in Baghdad.

80. Information on the status of the project and the required funding for 2010 is provided in section V of addendum 5 to the present report.

Table 1

Estimated costs of activities of special political missions

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	1 January 2008 to 31 December 2009			*Requirements for 2010*		*Variance analysis 2009-2010*		
	Appropriations	*Estimated expenditures*	*Estimated unencumbered balance*	*Total requirements*	*Non-recurrent requirements*	*Approved budget 2009*	*Variance*	*Mandates and expiry dates*
	1	*2*	*3=1-2*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7=4-6*	*8*
Thematic cluster I, Special and personal envoys and special advisers of the Secretary-General								
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar	1 368.0	1 364.8	3.2	1 159.1	2.3	753.2	405.9	General Assembly resolutions 62/222, 63/245
Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Cyprus	5 228.5	3 172.7	2 055.8	3 279.2	—	3 603.2	(324.0)	Series of Security Council resolutions, including 186 (1964), 367 (1975), 1250 (1999), 1475 (2003), 1758 (2007), 1818 (2008), 1873 (2009); open-ended
Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the prevention of genocide	2 475.8	2 453.9	21.9	1 780.2	0.5	1 332.5	447.7	Security Council resolution 1366 (2001); S/2004/567, S/2004/568; open-ended
Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara	1 213.8	495.4	718.4	690.7	1.1	628.4	62.3	S/2005/497, S/2005/498 (open-ended); Security Council resolution 1813 (2008)
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)	1 542.6	1 198.4	344.2	695.0	—	852.0	(157.0)	Security Council resolution 1559 (2004); PRST/2006/3; open-ended
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes region	—	—	—	3 042.0	27.1	—	3 042.0	S/PRST/2008/40; S/2008/684 and 685; Security Council resolutions 1843 (2008), 1856 (2008); open-ended
Subtotal I	**11 828.7**	**8 685.2**	**3 143.5**	**10 646.2**	**31.0**	**7 169.3**	**3 476.9**	

	1 January 2008 to 31 December 2009			Requirements for 2010		Variance analysis 2009-2010		
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures	Estimated unencumbered balance	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Approved budget 2009	Variance	Mandates and expiry dates
	1	2	3=1-2	4	5	6	7=4-6	8
Thematic cluster II, Sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels								
Monitoring Group on Somalia	2 469.2	2 474.5	(5.3)	1 555.2	—	1 243.7	311.5	Security Council resolution 1853 (2008); 31 March 2010
Panel of Experts on Liberia	1 341.4	1 219.9	121.5	757.4	—	741.8	15.6	Security Council resolution 1854 (2008); 20 December 2009
Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire	2 494.5	2 470.6	23.9	1 271.4	—	1 285.3	(13.9)	Security Council resolution 1842 (2008); 31 October 2009
Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo	2 905.0	2 521.4	383.6	1 452.3	—	1 596.4	(144.1)	Security Council resolutions 1807 (2008) and 1857 (2008); 30 November 2009
Panel of Experts on the Sudan	2 733.8	2 644.1	89.7	1 739.1	—	1 513.4	225.7	Security Council resolution 1891 (2009); 15 October 2010
Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	—	—	—	3 397.7	384.0	—	3 397.7	Security Council resolution 1874 (2009); 31 August 2010
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1526 (2004) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities	7 509.0	6 473.4	1 035.6	3 970.9	2.8	3 977.4	(6.5)	Security Council resolution 1822 (2008); 31 December 2009
Support to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction	4 789.9	4 450.2	339.7	3 393.9	416.0	2 507.4	886.5	Security Council resolution 1810 (2008); 25 April 2011

	1 January 2008 to 31 December 2009			Requirements for 2010		Variance analysis 2009-2010		
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures	Estimated unencumbered balance	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Approved budget 2009	Variance	Mandates and expiry dates
	1	2	3=1-2	4	5	6	7=4-6	8
Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate	15 460.8	15 402.9	57.9	8 958.7	40.0	7 995.0	963.7	Security Council resolution 1805 (2008); 31 December 2010
Subtotal II	**39 703.6**	**37 657.0**	**2 046.6**	**26 496.6**	**842.8**	**20 860.4**	**5 636.2**	
Thematic cluster III, United Nations offices, peacebuilding offices, integrated offices and commissions								
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa	11 077.0	10 680.1	396.9	6 966.1	99.2	5 714.4	1 251.7	S/2007/754; 31 December 2010
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic	—	—	—	17 991.6	3 262.5	—	17 991.6	S/PRST/2009/5; 31 December 2009
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau	—	—	—	19 016.6	2 735.4	—	19 016.6	Security Council resolution 1876 (2009); 31 December 2010
United Nations Political Office for Somalia	25 426.5	23 806.2	1 620.3	17 029.5	100.0	15 262.2	1 767.3	Security Council resolutions 1814 (2008), 1863 (2009), 1872 (2009); to be determined
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone	15 205.0	15 205.0	—	16 934.5	479.7	15 205.0	1 729.5	Security Council resolution 1886 (2009); 30 September 2010
United Nations support to the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission	15 958.6	14 060.7	1 897.9	8 930.1	75.7	8 099.9	830.2	S/2008/756 and S/2008/757; 31 December 2009
United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia	4 006.3	3 771.8	234.5	3 175.0	315.3	2 203.8	971.2	S/2007/279, S/2007/280; open-ended
United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi	70 167.5	70 167.5	—	46 258.0	1 097.7	37 898.4	8 359.6	Security Council resolution 1858 (2008); 31 December 2009

	1 January 2008 to 31 December 2009			Requirements for 2010		Variance analysis 2009-2010		
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures	Estimated unencumbered balance	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Approved budget 2009	Variance	Mandates and expiry dates
	1	2	3=1-2	4	5	6	7=4-6	8
United Nations Mission in Nepal	66 857.8	73 662.0	(6 804.2)	16 742.9	281.8	16 778.7	(35.8)	Security Council resolution 1879 (2009); 23 January 2010
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon	12 622.6	12 622.1	0.5	8 405.8	867.0	6 722.8	1 683.0	Security Council resolutions 1701 (2006) and 1773 (2007); S/2007/85, S/2007/86; open-ended
Subtotal III	**221 321.3**	**223 975.4**	**(2 654.1)**	**161 450.1**	**9 314.3**	**107 885.2**	**53 564.9**	
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	243 894.7	256 593.7	(12 699.0)	241 944.3	33 604.8	154 938.8	87 005.5	Security Council resolution 1868 (2009); 23 March 2010
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq	265 839.1	255 615.2	10 223.9	158 989.3	14 777.5	148 931.8	10 057.5	Security Council resolution 1883 (2009); 7 August 2010
Subtotal IV	**509 733.8**	**512 208.9**	**(2 475.1)**	**400 933.6**	**48 382.3**	**303 870.6**	**97 063.0**	
Total	**782 587.4**	**782 526.5**	**60.9**	**599 526.5**	**58 570.4**	**439 785.5**	**159 741.0**	
Other (additional appropriation for the biennium 2008-2009)								
Missions that were transformed into other operations								
United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone	27 034.7	27 034.7	—					
United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic	16 144.6	16 144.6	—					
United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau	8 737.9	8 737.9	—					

	1 January 2008 to 31 December 2009			Requirements for 2010		Variance analysis 2009-2010		
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures	Estimated unencumbered balance	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Approved budget 2009	Variance	Mandates and expiry dates
	1	2	3=1-2	4	5	6	7=4-6	8
Liquidated missions and missions anticipated for liquidation								
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the future status process for Kosovo	570.2	551.5	18.7					
United Nations International Independent Investigating Commission	41 337.4	39 719.5	1 617.9					
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Lord's Resistance Army-affected Areas	3 373.0	1 956.2	1 416.8					
United Nations Representative to the International Advisory and Monitoring Board	64.6	65.5	(0.9)					
Subtotal V	**97 262.4**	**94 209.9**	**3 052.5**	—	—	—	—	
Grand total	**879 849.8**	**876 736.4**	**3 113.4**	**599 526.5**	**58 570.4**	**439 785.5**	**159 741.0**	

Table 2

Detailed cost estimates per category of expenditure related to 27 special political missions proposed for 2010

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	1 January 2008 to 31 December 2009			*Requirements for 2010*		*Variance analysis 2009-2010*	
Category of expenditure	*Appropriation*	*Estimated expenditures*	*Estimated unencumbered balance*	*Total requirements*	*Non-recurrent requirements*	*Approved budget 2009*	*Variance*
	1	*2*	*3=1-2*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7=4-6*
I. Military and police personnel							
Military observers	11 002.2	11 143.2	(141.0)	4 560.7	—	4 711.1	(150.4)
Military contingent	23 700.5	20 820.9	2 879.6	13 336.7	—	12 416.5	920.2
Civilian police	1 780.4	1 539.5	240.9	1 603.2	—	982.3	620.9
Total, category I	**36 483.1**	**33 503.6**	**2 979.5**	**19 500.6**	**—**	**18 109.9**	**1 390.7**
II. Civilian personnel							
International staff	323 295.6	322 312.9	982.7	210 631.5	—	173 352.3	37 279.2
National staff	78 100.1	81 971.9	(3 871.8)	58 482.9	—	41 300.7	17 182.2
United Nations Volunteers	12 119.6	12 088.6	31.0	6 056.2	—	4 807.6	1 248.6
General temporary assistance	1 350.8	1 386.3	(35.5)	999.5	—	508.6	490.9
Total, category II	**414 866.1**	**417 759.7**	**(2 893.6)**	**276 170.1**	**—**	**219 969.2**	**56 200.9**
III. Operational costs							
Government-provided personnel	320.1	225.1	95.0	358.2	—	320.1	38.1
Consultants and experts	23 827.5	22 111.1	1 716.4	17 240.7	—	12 446.8	4 793.9
Official travel	20 897.2	22 147.4	(1 250.2)	16 693.1	—	9 748.7	6 944.4
Facilities and infrastructure	73 777.6	70 842.5	2 935.1	75 546.9	14 846.1	47 602.7	27 944.2
Ground transportation	54 652.0	51 681.6	2 970.4	30 067.7	22 063.6	32 186.3	(2 118.6)
Air transportation	96 750.2	100 009.7	(3 259.5)	98 149.9	115.6	63 194.9	34 955.0
Naval transportation	55.5	55.5	—	72.8	—	55.5	17.3
Communications	30 864.0	32 344.3	(1 480.3)	25 514.6	10 112.1	18 014.3	7 500.3
Information technology	16 141.2	17 127.1	(985.9)	15 925.3	10 156.7	9 552.0	6 373.3
Medical	3 147.2	2 847.4	299.8	2 760.4	372.6	1 970.5	789.9
Special equipment	129.6	30.0	99.6	90.0	90.0	88.4	1.6
Other supplies, services and equipment	10 676.1	11 841.5	(1 165.4)	19 736.2	813.7	6 526.2	13 210.0
Quick-impact projects	—	—	—	1 700.0	—	—	1 700.0
Total, category III	**331 238.2**	**331 263.2**	**(25.0)**	**303 855.8**	**58 570.4**	**201 706.4**	**102 149.4**
Total (net requirements)	**782 587.4**	**782 526.5**	**60.9**	**599 526.5**	**58 570.4**	**439 785.5**	**159 741.0**

Table 3
Staffing requirements

	Professional category and above									*General Service and related categories*				*National staff*			
	USG	*ASG*	*D-2*	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2*	***Subtotal***	*Field Service/ Security Service*	*Principal level*	*Other level*	***Subtotal, international***	*National officers*	*Local level*	*UNVs*	***Total***
I. Thematic cluster I, Special and personal envoys, and special advisers of the Secretary-General																	
1. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar																	
Approved 2009	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	**2**	—	—	1	**3**	—	—	—	**3**
Proposed 2010	1	—	—	—	—	2	1	—	**4**	—	—	1	**5**	—	—	—	**5**
2. Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus																	
Approved 2009	1	—	—	1	4	5	—	—	**11**	2	—	4	**17**	—	3	—	**20**
Proposed 2010	1	—	—	1	3	5	—	—	**10**	2	—	4	**16**	—	3	—	**19**
3. Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the prevention of genocide																	
Approved 2009	1	—	—	—	—	2	1	—	**4**	—	—	2	**6**	—	—	—	**6**
Proposed 2010	1	—	—	—	—	2	1	—	**4**	—	—	2	**6**	—	—	—	**6**
4. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara																	
Approved 2009	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	**1**	—	—	—	**1**	—	—	—	**1**
Proposed 2010	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	**1**	—	—	—	**1**	—	—	—	**1**
5. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)																	
Approved 2009	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	**2**	—	—	1	**3**	—	—	—	**3**
Proposed 2010	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	**2**	—	—	1	**3**	—	—	—	**3**
6. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on the Great Lakes region																	
Approved 2009	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	**0**	—	—	—	**0**	—	—	—	**0**
Proposed 2010	1	1	—	—	2	1	2	—	**7**	3	—	—	**10**	—	4	—	**14**
Subtotal, cluster I																	
Approved 2009	**5**	—	—	**1**	**4**	**9**	**1**	—	**20**	**2**	—	**8**	**30**	—	**3**	—	**33**
Proposed 2010	**6**	**1**	—	**1**	**5**	**11**	**4**	—	**28**	**5**	—	**8**	**41**	—	**7**	—	**48**

	Professional category and above									*General Service and related categories*				*National staff*			
	USG	*ASG*	*D-2*	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2*	***Subtotal***	*Field Service/ Security Service*	*Principal level*	*Other level*	***Subtotal, inter-national***	*National officers*	*Local level*	*UNVs*	***Total***
II. Thematic cluster II, Sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels																	
7. Monitoring Group on Somalia (previously Panel of Experts on Somalia)																	
Approved 2009	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	1	—	2
Proposed 2010	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	1	—	2
8. Panel of Experts on Liberia																	
Approved 2009	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Proposed 2010	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
9. Panel of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire																	
Approved 2009	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1
Proposed 2010	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1
10. Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo																	
Approved 2009	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1
Proposed 2010	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1
11. Panel of Experts on the Sudan																	
Approved 2009	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	1	2	—	—	—	2
Proposed 2010	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	1	2	—	—	—	2
12. Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea																	
Approved 2009	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0	—	—	—	0	—	—	—	0
Proposed 2010	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	2	—	—	2	4	—	—	—	4
13. Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established by Security Council resolution 1526 (2004) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals																	
Approved 2009	—	—	—	—	1	1	3	—	5	—	—	5	10	—	—	—	10
Proposed 2010	—	—	—	—	1	1	3	—	5	—	—	5	10	—	—	—	10
14. Support for the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction																	
Approved 2009	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	2	—	—	2	4	—	—	—	4
Proposed 2010	—	—	—	—	1	—	2	—	3	—	—	2	5	—	—	—	5

	Professional category and above									*General Service and related categories*				*National staff*			
	USG	*ASG*	*D-2*	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2*	***Subtotal***	*Field Service/ Security Service*	*Principal level*	*Other level*	***Subtotal, inter-national***	*National officers*	*Local level*	*UNVs*	***Total***
15. Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate																	
Approved 2009	—	1	1	2	9	11	3	3	**30**	—	—	8	**38**	—	—	—	**38**
Proposed 2010	—	1	1	2	9	12	3	4	**32**	—	—	8	**40**	—	—	—	**40**
Subtotal, cluster II																	
Approved 2009	**—**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**10**	**12**	**11**	**3**	**40**	**—**	**—**	**17**	**57**	**—**	**1**	**—**	**58**
Proposed 2010	**—**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**11**	**13**	**13**	**4**	**45**	**—**	**—**	**19**	**64**	**—**	**1**	**—**	**65**
III. Thematic cluster III, United Nations offices, peacebuilding offices, integrated offices and commissions																	
16. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa																	
Approved 2009	1	—	—	1	2	5	1	—	**10**	4	—	1	**15**	2	12	1	**30**
Proposed 2010	1	—	—	2	2	5	1	—	**11**	6	—	—	**17**	2	12	1	**32**
17. United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic																	
Approved 2009	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	**0**	—	—	—	**0**	—	—	—	**0**
Proposed 2010	—	1	1	1	5	10	7	1	**26**	37	—	—	**63**	12	77	5	**157**
18. United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau																	
Approved 2009	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	**0**	—	—	—	**0**	—	—	—	**0**
Proposed 2010	—	1	1	2	6	14	10	—	**34**	30	—	—	**64**	14	40	1	**119**
19. United Nations Political Office for Somalia																	
Approved 2009	1	—	1	2	10	18	10	1	**43**	21	—	—	**64**	12	16	—	**92**
Proposed 2010	1	—	1	2	10	17	12	1	**44**	23	—	—	**67**	12	26	—	**105**
20. United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone																	
Approved 2009	—	1	—	1	5	12	9	1	**29**	13	—	—	**42**	13	18	—	**73**
Proposed 2010	—	1	—	1	5	12	9	1	**29**	13	—	—	**42**	13	19	8	**82**
21. United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission																	
Approved 2009	2	—	1	—	3	7	2	—	**15**	—	—	1	**16**	—	6	—	**22**
Proposed 2010	1	—	—	—	3	7	2	—	**13**	1	—	—	**14**	—	6	—	**20**
22. United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia																	
Approved 2009	—	1	—	—	1	2	2	—	**6**	2	—	—	**8**	—	17	—	**25**
Proposed 2010	—	1	—	—	1	2	2	—	**6**	2	—	—	**8**	4	17	—	**29**

	Professional category and above									*General Service and related categories*				*National staff*			
	USG	*ASG*	*D-2*	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2*	***Subtotal***	*Field Service/ Security Service*	*Principal level*	*Other level*	***Subtotal, international***	*National officers*	*Local level*	*UNVs*	***Total***
23. United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi																	
Approved 2009	—	1	1	4	7	28	31	4	**76**	68	—	—	**144**	18	237	51	**450**
Proposed 2010	—	1	1	4	7	28	31	4	**76**	68	—	—	**144**	18	237	51	**450**
24. United Nations Mission in Nepal																	
Approved 2009	—	—	1	1	4	10	13	—	**29**	27	—	—	**56**	9	118	19	**202**
Proposed 2010	—	—	1	1	4	10	13	—	**29**	27	—	—	**56**	9	121	19	**205**
25. Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon																	
Approved 2009	1	1	—	1	3	3	4	2	**15**	6	—	2	**23**	2	56	0	**81**
Proposed 2010	1	1	—	1	3	4	2	2	**14**	8	—	—	**22**	3	57	0	**82**
Subtotal, cluster III																	
Approved 2009	**6**	**4**	**4**	**12**	**41**	**107**	**103**	**13**	**290**	**219**	—	**8**	**517**	**60**	**529**	**71**	**1 177**
Proposed 2010	**4**	**6**	**5**	**14**	**46**	**109**	**89**	**9**	**282**	**215**	—	—	**497**	**87**	**612**	**85**	**1 281**
IV.																	
26. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan																	
Approved 2009	1	2	4	8	27	87	96	57	**282**	123	0	20	**425**	230	1 309	59	**2 023**
Proposed 2010	1	2	4	16	25	129	126	68	**371**	200	0	0	**571**	315	1 874	81	**2 841**
27. United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq																	
Approved 2009	1	2	3	8	20	71	88	24	**217**	239	0	3	**459**	97	497	0	**1 053**
Proposed 2010	1	2	3	8	20	71	87	24	**216**	241	0	0	**457**	97	497	0	**1 051**
Subtotal IV																	
Approved 2009	**2**	**4**	**7**	**16**	**47**	**158**	**184**	**81**	**499**	**362**	—	**23**	**884**	**327**	**1 806**	**59**	**3 076**
Proposed 2010	**2**	**4**	**7**	**24**	**45**	**200**	**213**	**92**	**587**	**441**	—	—	**1 028**	**412**	**2 371**	**81**	**3 892**
Total																	
Approved 2009	**13**	**9**	**12**	**31**	**102**	**286**	**299**	**97**	**849**	**583**	—	**56**	**1 488**	**387**	**2 339**	**130**	**4 344**
Proposed 2010	**12**	**12**	**13**	**41**	**107**	**333**	**319**	**105**	**942**	**661**	—	**27**	**1 630**	**499**	**2 991**	**166**	**5 286**

	Professional category and above									General Service and related categories				National staff			
	USG	*ASG*	*D-2*	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2*	***Subtotal***	*Field Service/ Security Service*	*Principal level*	*Other level*	***Subtotal, international***	*National officers*	*Local level*	*UNVs*	***Total***
V. Other																	
Missions that were transformed into other operations																	
28. United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone																	
Approved 2009	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Proposed 2010	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
29. United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic																	
Approved 2009	—	1	—	—	2	4	2	4	**13**	8	—	9	**30**	—	61	5	**96**
Proposed 2010	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	**0**	—	—	—	**0**	—	—	—	—
30. United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau																	
Approved 2009	—	—	1	—	1	4	4	0	**10**	3	—	4	**17**	3	12	—	**32**
Proposed 2010	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	**0**	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Liquidated missions and missions anticipated for liquidation																	
31. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the future status process for Kosovo																	
Approved 2009	1	1	—	2	1	1	—	—	**6**	0	5	0	**11**	0	0	0	**11**
Proposed 2010	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	**0**	—	—	—	**0**	0	0	0	**0**
32. United Nations International Independent Investigating Commission																	
Approved 2009	1	—	—	2	6	22	31	5	**67**	78	—	4	**149**	4	49	—	**202**
Proposed 2010	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	**0**	—	—	—	**0**	0	0	0	**0**
33. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Lord's Resistance Army-affected Areas																	
Approved 2009	1	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	**4**	—	—	1	**5**	—	1	—	**6**
Proposed 2010	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	**0**	—	—	—	**0**	0	0	0	**0**

	Professional category and above									*General Service and related categories*				*National staff*			
	USG	*ASG*	*D-2*	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2*	***Subtotal***	*Field Service/ Security Service*	*Principal level*	*Other level*	***Subtotal, international***	*National officers*	*Local level*	*UNVs*	***Total***
34 United Nations Representative to the International Advisory and Monitoring Board																	
Approved 2009	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	**0**	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Proposed 2010	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	**0**	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Subtotal V																	
Approved 2009	**3**	**2**	**1**	**4**	**13**	**31**	**37**	**9**	**100**	**89**	**5**	**18**	**212**	**7**	**123**	**5**	**347**
Proposed 2010	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Grand total																	
Approved 2009	**16**	**11**	**13**	**35**	**115**	**317**	**336**	**106**	**949**	**672**	**5**	**74**	**1 700**	**394**	**2 462**	**135**	**4 691**
Proposed 2010	**12**	**12**	**13**	**41**	**107**	**333**	**319**	**105**	**942**	**661**	—	**27**	**1 630**	**499**	**2 991**	**166**	**5 286**
Change	**(4)**	**1**	**—**	**6**	**(8)**	**16**	**(17)**	**(1)**	**(7)**	**(11)**	**(5)**	**(47)**	**(70)**	**105**	**529**	**31**	**595**

IV. Action required of the General Assembly

81. **The General Assembly is requested:**

(a) **To approve the budgets for the 27 special political missions listed in table 1 for the period up to December 2010 in the total amount $599,526,500 net;**

(b) **To approve a charge totalling $599,526,500 net against the provision for special political missions requested in section 3, Political affairs, of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2010-2011;**

(c) **To approve commitment authority for UNAMI in the amount of $5 million under section 33, Construction, alteration, improvement and major maintenance, of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2010-2011, to undertake design work in connection with the construction of the United Nations integrated compound in Baghdad.**

Annex I

Special political missions 2008-2009: lead department and administrative support arrangements

		Lead department	*Administrative support*
Thematic cluster I, Special and personal envoys, and special advisers of the Secretary-General			
1	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar	DPA	DPA
2	Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus	DPA	DFS
3	Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for the prevention of genocide	DPA	DPA
4	Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara	DPA	DPA
5	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)	DPA	DPA
6	Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Lebanon/United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon	DPA	DFS
7	United Nations Representative to the International Advisory and Monitoring Board	DM	DM
Thematic cluster II, Sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels			
1	Monitoring Group on Somalia	DPA	DPA
2	Panel of Experts on Liberia	DPA	DPA
3	Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire	DPA	DPA
4	Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo	DPA	DPA
5	Panel of Experts on the Sudan	DPA	DPA
6	Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1526 (2004) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities	DPA	DPA
7	Support to the Security Council Committee established by Council resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction	ODA	ODA
8	Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate	CTED	CTED

		Lead department	*Administrative support*
Thematic cluster III, United Nations offices, peacebuilding offices, integrated offices and commissions			
1	Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa	DPA	DFS
2	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic	DPA	DFS
3	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau	DPA	DFS
4	United Nations Political Office for Somalia	DPA	DFS
5	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone	DPA	DFS
6	United Nations support to the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission	DPA	DFS
7	United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia	DPA	DFS
8	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi	DPKO	DFS
9	United Nations Mission in Nepal	DPA	DFS
United Nations Assistance Missions			
1	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	DPKO	DFS
2	United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq	DPA	DFS
Missions that were liquidated and/or transformed into other operations during 2008-2009			
1	Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the future status process for Kosovo	DPKO	DFS
2	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone	DPKO	DFS
3	International Independent Investigating Commission	DPA	DFS
4	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Lord's Resistance Army-affected Areas	DPA	DFS

Abbreviations: CTED, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate; DFS, Department of Field Support; DM, Department of Management; DPA, Department of Political Affairs; DPKO, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; ODA, Office for Disarmament Affairs.

Annex II

Summary of provisions for special political missions, 2010-2011

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Amount included under section 3, Political affairs, of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2010-2011	828 928.4
Charges proposed for approval by the General Assembly for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2010 contained in the present report	
Cluster I	10 646.2
Cluster II	26 496.6
Cluster III	161 450.1
UNAMA	241 944.3
UNAMI	158 989.3
Total charges	**599 526.5**
Balance in the provision for special political missions	**229 401.9**

Annex III

Updated estimate of the provision required for special political missions for the biennium 2010-2011

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	Requirements for 2010	*Updated estimate for 2010-2011*[a]
Cluster I	10 646.2	21 261.4
Cluster II	26 496.6	52 150.4
Cluster III	161 450.1	296 843.0
UNAMA	241 944.3	475 283.8
UNAMI	158 989.3	303 201.1
Total estimate	**599 526.5**	**1 148 739.7**

[a] The estimate is based on the following considerations:

(i) The updated estimate for 2010-2011 is conservatively calculated and is based on current biennium information only. It is not intended to make any claims as to the direction and decisions that may be taken by the Security Council or the General Assembly. The mandates of the existing complement of special political missions will continue as approved by the Security Council or the General Assembly.

(ii) Requirements for UNMIN (cluster III) for 2011 have been excluded as it is anticipated for liquidation.

(iii) UNAMA is expected to further expand the establishment of provisional offices in 2011 by a further five on top of the six already proposed in 2010.

(iv) The non-recurrent provisions estimated for 2010 have been excluded for 2011.

(v) A technical doubling of provisions for 2011 has been used as the basis of calculations, except for the considerations set out in (i) to (iv) above.